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Illyricum, the Adriatic, and Italy 
in the plans of Mithradates VI Eupator
Ilirik, Jadran in Italija v načrtih Mitradata VI. Evpatorja
Marjeta ŠAŠEL KOS
Izvleček
Mitradat VI. Evpator (120–63 pr. Kr.), najpomembnejši kralj Ponta v Mali Aziji, je osvojil bosporsko kraljestvo in 
večino dežel ob Črnem morju vključno s Kolhido, priključil svojemu kraljestvu Kapadokijo in Bitinijo ter širil oblast tudi 
drugod po Mali Aziji in Grčiji. Bil je eden najhujših sovražnikov Rima. Strabon omenja, da je že na začetku vlade hotel 
prodreti do Jadrana in se pripravljal na vojno z Rimljani. Tudi z upornim rimskim generalom Kvintom Sertorijem naj bi 
načrtovala vpad v Italijo, Sertorij z zahoda, Mitradat z vzhoda; Plutarh je Sertorija primerjal s Hanibalom, Mitradata pa 
s Pirom. Proti koncu tretje in zadnje vojne proti Mitradatu se je z njim uspešno bojeval Pompej. V virih je sporočeno, 
da je kralj malo pred uporom sina Farnaka in svojo smrtjo načrtoval invazijo Italije čez deželo Skordiskov, Panonijo in 
Alpe. Kot je poudaril Florus, je Mitradat vpad le načrtoval (ni namreč hotel priznati poraza) in ga ni mogel uresničiti, 
na vrhuncu njegovega vladanja pa vdor v Italijo čez Ilirik ne bi bil nemogoč.
Ključne besede: Ilirik, Panonija, Jadran, 1. st. pr. Kr., Mitradat VI. Evpator
Abstract
Mithradates VI Eupator (120–63 BC) was the greatest of the kings of Pontus in Asia Minor, gradually extending his 
control over most of the regions, gravitating toward Euxine, including Colchis, and annexing Cappadocia and Bithynia. 
He exercised his authority over other lands in Asia Minor and Greece, becoming one of the most formidable enemies 
of the Roman state. Strabo refers to Mithradates’ intended military campaign against the Romans up to the Adriatic at 
an earlier stage of the king’s rule. Mithradates had already contemplated invading Italy at the time of his contacts with 
Quintus Sertorius in 75 BC; according to Plutarch, Sertorius was compared to Hannibal, Mithradates to Pyrrhus. The 
last to wage war victoriously against Mithradates was Pompey the Great. Ancient sources refer to the king’s plan of in-
vading Italy across the territories of the Scordisci, Pannonia, and the Alps shortly before the revolt of his son Pharnaces 
and his own death. As is mentioned by Florus, Mithradates only planned an invasion (not wishing to admit the defeat), 
but was not able to carry it out. However, during the heyday of his reign such a plan would not have been impossible.
Keywords: Illyricum, Pannonia, Adriatic, 1st century BC, Mithradates VI Eupator
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MITHRADATES: A BRIEF SKETCH
Mithradates VI Eupator Dionysus (120–63 BC) 
was the eldest son of Mithradates V Euergetes and 
the greatest of the kings of Pontus in Asia Minor 
(Fig. 1). His ruthless reign, which began with the 
imprisonment and murder of his mother and 
younger brother (whom their mother preferred), 
made him one of the most formidable enemies of 
the Romans. After he conquered Crimea and the 
northern and north-western regions along the Black 
Sea including Colchis, he gradually extended his 
control over most of the regions, gravitating toward 
Euxine. In some Asian regions he exercised indirect 
control, such as in Cappadocia, through the local 
noble Gordius, Mithradates’ sister Laodice and her 
son Ariarathes VII, and his own son, who ruled as 
Ariarathes IX, with Gordius as his regent. With the 
temporary help of Nicomedes III of Bithynia he 
annexed Paphlagonia, planning his conquests also 
in view of possibly waging war against the Romans. 
The meeting with C. Marius in Cappadocia took 
place in 99 BC or a year after; Marius’ mission and 
intentions are controversial.1 After Sulla’s arrival 
in this region, Mithradates began preparations for 
a war against Rome; eventually, he also annexed 
Cappadocia and Bithynia. The Roman state was 
at war at that time, since the country was ravaged 
in the course of the Social War (91–87 BC), when 
Italian allies fought against Rome’s predominance.
The control that Mithradates exercised over 
most of the shores of the Black Sea enabled him to 
draw on manpower and other resources to supply 
his armies. It is difficult to trace the borders of 
his kingdom and of the regions under his control 
because they constantly changed as a result of his 
policy, which was partly aggressive and partly 
defensive and was not always successful. He acted 
both as an oriental autocrat and an enlightened 
Hellenistic ruler, claiming Persian and Macedonian 
descent. Proclaiming himself a new Alexander and 
Dionysus, he directed his Hellenism toward free-
ing the Greeks from the “barbarian” Romans. His 
1  Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 66–71; Mayor 2016, 116–118. 
I would very much like to thank Andreas Hofeneder for 
having read my paper and for offering valuable comments. 
My sincere thanks are due to Johannes Nollé for his helpful 
remarks regarding the first part of my text.
policy was a complicated blend of clever diplomacy, 
intrigues and brutal force, combined with various 
ways of negotiation, impossible to briefly summa-
rize. Moreover – and not least – the accounts of 
Plutarch, Appian, Cassius Dio, and summarized 
descriptions of events in Strabo and other Greek 
and Latin writers are not always compatible.
Mithradates ultimately subdued or controlled 
most of Asia Minor, directly or indirectly pro-
voking three major Roman wars.2 In the course 
of the First Mithradatic War (between 89 and 85 
BC), his armies were victorious, much of Asia was 
conquered, and in 88 BC he ordered a massacre of 
Italians and Romans who were living in Asia Minor 
(the “Ephesian Vespers”). After having subdued 
the province of Asia, Mithradates regarded his 
conquest as temporary and, therefore, plundered 
the province in various ways, partly for want of 
money, partly for mistrust in the cities and their 
leaders; he also encouraged piracy. Most of Greece 
– and notably Athens – were willing to support 
his cause, but he was not able to capture Rhodes. 
However, in 87 Sulla came to Greece with five 
legions, conquered and punished Athens, defeated 
Mithradates’ armies, and crossed the Hellespont 
to Asia, where the king surrendered and withdrew 
to Pontus.
Sulla had to return to Italy to fight his foes, 
leaving in Anatolia his general L. Licinius Murena, 
who was responsible for the Second Mithradatic 
War (ca. 83–81), which was of lesser significance 
and mostly unsuccessful.3 Nonetheless, Murena 
could celebrate a triumph, as did all generals who 
had fought against Mithradates; in this respect, 
the king was “Rome’s perfect enemy”.4 The third 
and the last war against Mithradates was trig-
gered by the death of Nicomedes IV of Bithynia 
in 76 or 75 BC, who bequeathed his kingdom to 
Rome; Rome wanted to annex it, but in 74 or 73 
Mithradates invaded it. It is noteworthy that one 
of his allies was also Quintus Sertorius, the Roman 
2  On the chronology of the three wars, see De Callataÿ 
1997; see also Bratož 2007, 124–126; 131–133. On the 
provocative policy of the king: McGing 2009. See, on 
various other aspects of Mithradates and his reign Højte 
(ed.) 2009. On archaeology: Lafli, Pataci 2016.
3  Broughton 1952, 61; 64; 77.
4  Madsen 2009; Id. 2014.
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rebel in Spain, which sheds light on the diverse 
connections of the king.5 It is reported that in 75 
BC they considered attacking Italy simultaneously 
from the west and from the east.6
However, Mithradates could not capture Cyzicus 
in southern Propontis (Mysia); the Roman general 
L. Licinius Lucullus, who raised the siege, compelled 
him to seek refuge with his son-in-law, the Arme-
nian king Tigranes II; Mithradates unsuccessfully 
sought the support of the Parthians. It was only 
in 68 that he succeeded in returning to Pontus. 
Pompey the Great defeated him in Lesser Armenia, 
but in 66 BC abandoned pursuing him, in order to 
subdue Tigranes. Having wintered at Dioscurias, 
Mithradates retreated through the Caucasus, taking 
refuge in his Crimean kingdom, which he reached 
in 65 BC. He occupied Panticapaeum and stationed 
some of his army at Phanagorea, as well as at the 
Crimean harbours of Chersonesus, Theodosia, 
and Nymphaion,7 expecting an attack by sea, 
since Pompey had stationed his fleet at Phasis to 
control the access to the Bosporus. It was then that 
he supposedly planned a major invasion of Italy 
through Illyricum.8 However, his son Pharnaces 
revolted against him, and Mithradates took his 
own life (or was perhaps assassinated) in 63 BC.9
5  Arrayás Morales 2016.
6  Plut., Sert. 23; App., Mithr. 68; see below.
7  Plut., Pomp. 32. 9; App., Mithr. 101–102 (cf. 107 and 
108); Livy, Epit. 101; Cass. Dio 36. 50. 2; Gajdukevič 1971, 
320–322; McGing 1986, 162–165.
8  Mastrocinque 1999, 103–109.
9  Sherwin-White 1994, 254–255.
Appian of Alexandria is the main source that 
mentions the plan of Mithradates VI Eupator to 
attack Italy across Illyricum. This invasion, which 
the king contemplated towards the end of his life, 
is further mentioned by Plutarch, Cassius Dio, and 
Florus, while Strabo refers to Mithradates’ intended 
military campaign against the Romans up to the 
Adriatic at an earlier stage of the king’s rule.
MITHRADATES’ PLANNED CAMPAIGN TO 
THE ADRIATIC IN STRABO’S GEOGRAPHY
Strabo refers to the Pontic king in his seventh 
book, in which he described northern Europe and 
Germania, as well as Illyria, Thessaly, Macedonia, 
and the Pontic regions as far as the Tanais.10 Towards 
the end of the third chapter, he listed the countries 
along the rivers Borysthenes (the Dnieper) and 
Hypanis (the Bog), towns and settlements along 
these rivers, as well as the peoples of the interior, 
the Sarmatian Iazyges and various German peo-
ples, such as the Bastarnae and Tyregetae, and the 
most northerly of them, the Roxolani, who waged 
wars with the generals of Mithradates Eupator (7. 
3. 17 C 306).
In the next paragraph, Strabo mentioned the cold 
regions around Lake Maeotis (modern Sea of Azov), 
where people did not breed asses (because they are 
sensitive to cold), horses were small, and cattle had 
no horns. In winter, fish could be obtained from 
the ice by digging; when the water in bronze water-
10  See a commentary to all cited passages in Roller 
2018, 360–364.
Fig. 1: Tetradrachm, Pergamum, 85/84 BC. Av: head of Mithradates. Rv: grazing stag, alluding to Ephesian Artemis.
Sl. 1: Tetradrahma kovana v Pergamonu 85/84 pr. Kr. Av.: Mitradatov portret; rv.: jelen, ki se pase, aluzija na efeško Artemido.
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jars froze, they burst. Neoptolemus, the general of 
Mithradates, conquered these barbarians during a 
summer in a naval battle, and in winter in a cavalry 
engagement, probably between the years 99 and 95 
BC, or even in the 80s BC, but possibly as early as 
the late second century BC.11 During the reign of 
Philip II, the father of Alexander the Great, Ateas 
ruled over most of these peoples. From Lucian’s 
Macrobii it is known that he was killed in the war 
against the Macedonian king at the age of ninety.12 
In the fourth century BC, the Macedonians indeed 
had contacts with these distant peoples.
In the fourth chapter, Strabo described Tauric 
Chersonesus (modern Crimea) with the city of the 
same name, which, after having been attacked and 
plundered by the barbarians, called in Mithradates 
Eupator to protect it. At this point, Strabo added 
an enigmatic sentence, mentioning the Adriatic:
7. 4. 3 C 309:
[...] who (Mithradates) was then planning to lead 
an army against the barbarians living above the 
isthmus up to the Borysthenes and against those up 
to the Adriatic; these, however, were arrangements 
to prepare a military campaign against the Romans.
It can be claimed that Strabo, through his 
family’s associations with the Pontic kings, knew 
these regions, as well as historical events that had 
taken place there during the reign of Mithradates. 
Nonetheless, at first glance, the statement about 
these two campaigns in one sentence seems uncon-
nected. It could be explained by the assumption 
that Strabo understood the king’s policy from the 
very start as an uninterrupted process leading to 
the wars with the Romans.13 It is not clear when 
Mithradates’ campaign against the Scythians and 
other barbarian peoples up to the Borysthenes 
took place, possibly in 110 or 109 BC, or perhaps 
even five years earlier,14 which seems too early if 
in the same sentence a military campaign against 
the Romans is mentioned. Mithradates may well 
have planned a military expedition as far as the 
Adriatic at an early date; however, nothing more 
is known about it. An early campaign that would 
have involved the Adriatic could have been related 
to some unrecorded negotiations of the king with 
various dynasts in the Balkans, or perhaps to his 
early affairs in Greece.
11  Geyer 1935; Roller 2018, 362.
12  Macrobii 10.
13  Roller 2018, 363–364.
14  Geyer 1932, 2164; earlier: McGing 1986, 46–47; see 
Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 43–55.
A CONTEMPLATED INVASION OF ITALY 
SHORTLY BEFORE MITHRADATES’ DEATH: 
APPIAN’S DATA
As has been suggested, Appian might have based 
his narrative on a Greek source, which was not 
particularly favourable to Lucullus and Pompey.15 
In his History of Mithradates (102. 472–473), refer-
ring to 65 BC, Appian wrote:
Mithradates finally reached the regions of the 
Maeotis (the sea of Azov), of which there were many 
princes, all of whom received him, escorted him, and 
exchanged numerous presents with him, on account 
of the fame of his deeds, his empire, and his power, 
which was still not to be despised. He even formed 
an alliance with them in contemplation of other 
and more novel exploits, such as marching through 
Thrace to Macedonia, through the country of the 
Macedonians to the Paeones, and passing over the 
Alps into Italy (Fig. 2).16
There is hardly any doubt that the Paeones in 
this context should be understood as the Pan-
nonians in Pannonia and not the Paeones north 
of Macedonia.17 Appian discussed the Paeones in 
his Illyrian History (chapter 14), and this passage 
makes it clear that he did not distinguish correctly 
between the Paeonians and Pannonians.18 In most 
instances, however, he had the Pannonians in mind 
when he spoke about the Paeones, only referring 
to the “Pannonians” to explain that they were 
called “Paeones”.
In the same History of Mithradates, but several 
paragraphs later (an indication that he might have 
used several sources), Appian again referred to 
Mithradates’ plans to invade Italy across the country 
of the Celts. In the previously cited passage Appian 
omitted to mention this significant people settled 
15  Mastrocinque 1999, 103–109.
16  ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ἐς τὴν Μαιῶτιν ἐμβαλών, ἧς εἰσι 
πολλοὶ δυνάσται, πάντων αὐτὸν κατὰ κλέος ἔργων τε καὶ 
ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἔτι οἱ παρούσης ἀξιολόγου δεχομένων 
τε καὶ παραπεμπόντων καὶ δῶρα πολλὰ φερόντων καὶ 
κομιζομένων ἕτερα, ὃ δὲ καὶ συμμαχίαν αὐτοῖς ἐτίθετο, 
ἐπινοῶν ἕτερα καινότερα, διὰ Θρᾴκης ἐς Μακεδονίαν καὶ 
διὰ Μακεδόνων ἐς Παίονας ἐμβαλὼν ὑπερελθεῖν ἐς τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν τὰ Ἄλπεια ὄρη· Translated by Horace White (The 
Loeb Classical Library). The episode is discussed in Šašel 
Kos 2005, 530–534.
17  Sherwin-White 1984, 205–206, misunderstood Appian’s 
reference to the Paeones, taking it to mean Paeonia; thus 
he erroneously regarded Mithradates’ plan as impossible 
on this account. Also see Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 273, for 
similar misunderstanding.
18  See also the commentary in Šašel Kos 2005.
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in the Balkans close to the Danube, whose country 
would have to be crossed on the way to Italy. He 
did so in chapter 109 of his History of Mithradates, 
where he again reported the king’s plan of an inva-
sion of Italy. Appian mentioned certain Celts as the 
first to bar the way both to the Paeones/Pannonians 
and Italy. His passage reads (Mithrid. 109. 518–519):
He (Mithradates) proposed to turn his course to 
the Celts, whose friendship he had cultivated a long 
time for this purpose, and with them to invade Italy, 
hoping that many of the Italians themselves would 
join him on account of their hatred of the Romans; 
for he had heard that such had been Hannibal’s policy 
when the Romans were waging war against him in 
Spain and that he had become in this way an object 
of the greatest terror to them. However, Appian also 
added that Mithradates’ soldiers distrusted this 
bold plan fearing a defeat, and refused to march 
through the Balkans: Filled with this idea he was 
for hastening to the Celts; but the very boldness of 
the plan, which would have brought him great glory, 
made the soldiers shrink from prolonged service in 
a foreign land, against men whom they could not 
overcome even in their own country.19
19  Ibid., 109. 520–521. Translated by Horace White 
(The Loeb Classical Library). See also Plutarch (Pomp., 
The Scordisci seem to be the only Celtic people, 
who could be regarded as Mithradates’ allies; they 
were settled in the broad area of the confluence 
of the Sava and the Danube Rivers, as well as in 
the Morava (Margus) Valley.20 The regions next 
to them, to the west, were inhabited by the Celtic 
people of the Taurisci.21 The army of Mithradates 
would have needed – in case the king put into 
effect his military plan – to traverse the territo-
ries of the Scordisci before reaching those of the 
Pannonians. When conceiving an invasion from 
Crimea to Italy, the first Celtic people on his way 
that could have represented a threat could have 
indeed only been the Scordisci. It seems less likely 
that these would have been the Bastarnae, who were 
also Mithradates’ allies,22 first of all, because they 
were regarded as German,23 and further because 
they would not have been a critical obstacle on 
his way to Italy.
41. 2), Strabo (7. 4. 3 C 309), and Cassius Dio (37. 11). 
On Florus (1. 40. 25), see below.
20  Papazoglu 1978, 271 f.; Popović 1999, cf. Tapavički-
Ilić 2004.
21  Božič 1991; Dizdar 2001; Guštin 2011.
22  Papazoglu 1978, 312–313; cf. Popović 1999.
23  Strabo 7. 3. 17 C 306; Pliny (N. h. 4. 100), and 
Tacitus (Germ. 46. 1).
Fig. 2: Possible variants of Mithradates’ planned route across the Balkans to Italy.
Sl. 2: Možne variante načrtovane Mitradatove poti čez Balkan v Italijo.
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WAS SUCH A PLAN A MERE FANTASY 
OR INTENTIONAL DISINFORMATION?
Mithradates had already contemplated invading 
Italy at the time of his contacts with Sertorius in 
75 BC; according to Appian, two of Sertorius’ sup-
porters, Lucius Magius and Lucius Fannius played 
a significant intermediary role advising the king to 
ally himself with Sertorius. Appian writes (Mithr. 
68, translated by H. White, Loeb Class. Library): 
Mithradates [...] sent ambassadors to Sertorius. 
The latter introduced them to his senate and prided 
himself that his fame had extended to Pontus and 
that he could now besiege the Roman power from 
both the east and the west. Plutarch writes that while 
Sertorius was compared to Hannibal, Mithradates 
was to Pyrrhus (Sert. 23). However, no such double 
attack had ever been attempted.
The plan to march into Italy as described by 
Appian, conceived by the king shortly before his 
death, is also mentioned by Plutarch, Cassius Dio, 
and Florus.24 Plutarch referred to it when he men-
tioned Pompey’s march to Petra, the capital of the 
Arab Nabataeans, where the Roman general wished 
to obtain personal confirmation of the Nabataean 
king to comply with the commands of the Roman 
army as he had consented to do. Pompey’s followers 
regarded the expedition as unnecessary and indeed 
as an evasion from the pursuit of the old Roman 
enemy Mithradates, particularly since a rumour 
circulated that the king was preparing to march 
with an army through Scythia and Paeonia to Italy 
(Pomp. 41. 2: ... ὡς ἀπηγγέλλετο, διὰ Σκυθῶν καὶ 
Παιόνων στρατὸν ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν.). Paeonia 
here is, of course, Pannonia, as is clear both from 
the context and the mentioned current usage of 
Greek authors, writing during the Imperial period. 
Dio similarly made mention of Mithradates’ plan 
to invade Italy from the Danube and Scythia (37. 
11. 1–2: ... πρός τε τὸν Ἴστρον Σκυθῶν ἐλθεῖν, 
κἀντεῦθεν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐσβαλεῖν).
Florus, however, mentioned an invasion through 
Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece, the usual route 
for the Roman armies to return from the East 
to Italy across the sea, or, vice versa, travel from 
24  See also Justin, who mentions embassies sent by 
Mithradates to the Cimbri, Gallograeci, the Sarmatae, 
and the Bastarnae (38. 3. 7), and refers to Hannibal, the 
invasion of Transalpine Gauls into Italy, and to Asian Gauls, 
who had to make a long and difficult journey through 
Illyricum and Thrace to their new territories (38. 4. 1–10). 
Cf. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 214–216.
Italy to the East. However, he emphasized that 
it had only been a plan; Mithradates supposedly 
considered bridging the Bosporus. Florus’ text 
reads (1. 40. 24–26):
That night [referring to the battle in Armenia, 
in which Pompey decisively defeated the king] saw 
the final defeat of Mithradates; for he never again 
effected anything, although, like a snake, which, 
though its head is crushed, threatens to the last with 
its tail, he tried every expedient. For, after escaping 
from the enemy to the Colchians, he formed a plan 
(though it remained only a plan) of bridging the 
Bosporus and then crossing through Thrace, Mac-
edonia and Greece and making a sudden inroad in 
Italy; but, baulked by the desertion of his subjects 
and the treachery of his son Pharnaces, he ended 
by the sword a life which he had in vain tried to 
destroy with poison.25
It should be noted that in the French Collec-
tion Budé edition the translation of the relevant 
sentence referring to the plan to invade Italy 
reads: ([...] iungere Bosporon, inde per Thracen 
Macedoniamque et Graeciam transilire, sic Italiam 
nec opinatus invadere – tantum cogitavit.) : “[...] il 
conçut le projet grandiose de jeter un pont sur le 
Bosphore, de bondir ensuite à travers la Thrace, 
la Macédoine et la Grèce et ainsi d’envahir à 
l’improviste l’Italie”.26
To advance through Macedonia and Greece 
would imply proceeding along the via Egnatia. In 
this case, Mithradates would have needed a fleet 
and have had it available in the Adriatic; neither 
that nor a march along the Egnatian road would 
have been possible shortly before his end. Since 
all other authors refer to Mithradates’ planned 
march across Illyricum, it is clear that Florus must 
have confused the regions he noted. Perhaps he 
was not aware that Paeonia, which he might have 
found in his source, referred to Pannonia and not 
to the country immediately north of Macedonia.
Clearly Mithradates’ plan was never carried out, 
but the question is, whether it would have been 
25  Translated by E. S. Forster (Loeb Classical Library 
1929). The Latin text reads: (24) Et Mithridates quidem 
nocte illa debellatus est. Nihil enim postea valuit, quamquam 
omnia expertus more anguium, qui optrito capite postremum 
cauda minantur. (25) Quippe cum efugisset hostem Colchis 
tenus, iungere Bosporon, inde per Thracen Macedoniamque 
et Graeciam transilire, sic Italiam nec opinatus invadere – 
tantum cogitavit. (26) Sed defectione civium Pharnacisque 
filii scelere praeventus male temptatum veneno spiritum 
ferro expulit.
26  Jal 1967, 95.
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feasible at all. Theodor Mommsen was explicit: 
“Diese beabsichtigte Invasion der Orientalen in 
Italien war einfach lächerlich und nichts als die 
Ausgeburt einer ohnmächtig phantasierenden 
Verzweiflung.”27 Théodore Reinach, in contrast, 
described it as a dream of young Mithradates that 
would not be impossible under different circum-
stances.28 Fritz Geyer also did not regard it as 
impossible: “So phantastisch dieser Plan auf den 
ersten Blick auch erscheint, unmöglich war unter 
den damaligen Verhältnissen ein Erfolg nicht.”29 
Fanula Papazoglu only referred to Mithradates’ 
plan in passing, but she never regarded it as im-
possible, and neither did Gajdukevič.30 The two 
opinions are not mutually exclusive, but it is clear 
that briefly before his death when Mithradates 
(again) planned this invasion, it would certainly 
not have been possible to carry it out. Ladislas 
Havas regarded Mithradates’ plan as a realistic 
and strategically farsighted project, related to 
the Catilinarian conspiracy; Mithradates would 
have been aided by the friendly Gauls who would 
have been the distant Allobroges and supported 
by the Catilinarian conspirators.31 However, this 
hypothesis has not been argued convincingly and 
does not seem likely.
At an earlier time, with all resources at Mithra-
dates’ disposal, his plan would have probably been 
achievable, and indeed, the Romans must have 
been well aware of the menace represented by the 
Pontic king. On the eve of the Third Mithradatic 
War, they systematically waged war against the 
peoples of the Balkans, who could be possible Mith-
radates’ allies. This is suggested by the campaign 
of C. Scribonius Curio, proconsul in Macedonia 
(75–72 BC), who continued the campaign of his 
predecessor Appius Claudius Pulcher (77–76 BC). 
Commanding a (too) large army of five legions, 
he defeated the Dardanians and was the first of 
27  Mommsen 1909, 135.
28  Reinach 1895, 402–404. He correctly stressed “different 
circumstances”, therefore Bengtson’s critical remark (1975, 
275: “... die Phantasie dem sonst so kritischen Forscher 
einen Streich gespielt [hat]”) does not seem justified to me.
29  Geyer 1932, 2196.
30  E.g., Papazoglu 1978, 312–313; Gajdukevič 1971, 
320–321; Bratož 2007, 133, regarded them as a result of a 
wrong estimation of Balkan distances.
31  Havas 1968, particularly 13–25, but his arguments are 
not only hypothetical, but also implausible, see Ballesteros 
Pastor 1996, 270–274, who convincingly refuted them.
all Roman generals to reach the Danube, having 
advanced as far as Dacia.32
An exhaustive commentary concerning Mith-
radates’ last plans – not, however, similar plans 
at any other time of Mithradates’ rule – has been 
offered by Holger Sonnabend, according to whom 
most former opinions could roughly be reduced to 
three main theses. Discussing them in detail, he 
called attention to various weak points of previous 
proposals, putting forward his own explanation, 
which can be regarded as reasonable. A summarized 
account will be presented here, without repeating 
in extenso the arguments pro and contra, since 
these and the pertinent literature can be consulted 
in Sonnabend’s contribution.33 The first thesis, 
regarding Mithradates’ last plans as realistic and 
intended to be carried out, but only prevented by 
the revolt of Pharnaces, should in his opinion be 
regarded as the least plausible. However, as has 
been seen, this was argued by several scholars 
and also by Havas and has actually been one of 
the most favoured explanations.
It has further been proposed that the projected 
invasion of Italy would have been an idea of Mith-
radates’ contemporaries and should be judged 
a legend,34 or, better, invented by his enemies, 
to stigmatize the king as an entirely unrealistic 
strategist. Such propaganda might have served 
his son Pharnaces in his attempt to win over his 
father’s troops,35 or it would have been made up by 
certain political adversaries of Pompey the Great 
in order to ruin his reputation since he could not 
defeat Mithradates in 66 BC.36 This seems less 
likely, as does the idea that Mithradates’ last plans 
should be explained as a literary topos.37 This lat-
ter explanation was discussed as the third possible 
thesis by Sonnabend,38 who offered a fourth one. 
Mithradates would have spread rumours about an 
invasion into Italy (which he never intended to put 
into effect), in order to enhance his own political 
position and possibly persuade Pompey to resume 
negotiations. This opinion is more plausible, since 
32  Syme 1999, 135–136; cf. Wheeler 2011, 197–199; 
most recently: Petković 2014.
33  Sonnabend 1998. Under the same title a student 
published his seminar study (Gruber 2005), containing a 
short superficial summary of this discussion.
34  Bengtson 1975, 275–276.
35  McGing 1986, 165.
36  Sherwin-White 1984, 205; discussed by Sonnabend 
1998, 201–203.
37  As, e.g., Strobel 1996, 146–149.
38  Sonnabend 1998, 203–204.
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it is much more likely to assume that the idea 
of an invasion into Italy would not have been 
invented by the king’s enemies but conceived by 
the king himself. As has been pointed out, he had 
contemplated such an invasion at an earlier date. If 
enemies had to be postulated at all, it could only 
be suggested that his idea would have been taken 
up by his adversaries and made ridiculous to harm 
him. Admittedly, however, the core of none of the 
mentioned hypotheses can be entirely rejected,39 
and there are others in the vast literature about 
Mithradates VI Eupator, divergent in details.40
PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS 
OF CROSSING ILLYRICUM
Although an invasion of Italy planned by Mith-
radates was probably never meant to be carried out, 
it should be recalled that an incursion into Italy 
from the East had been a real threat ever since the 
Cimbri invaded Noricum in 113 BC and defeated 
Cn. Papirius Carbo at Noreia. Eventually, they 
were defeated in 101 BC by C. Marius in northern 
Italy.41 Indeed, even before this event, the Roman 
state feared a possible invasion of Italy through 
the so-called Illyro-Italian Gate near Postojna. 
When in 171 BC C. Cassius Longinus, who had 
been assigned Cisalpine Gaul, left his province in 
an attempt to reach Macedonia with his army and 
earn a triumph, the Senate acted immediately to 
prevent his march. The senators expressed fear 
that Longinus’ march across the Balkans might 
open the way to Italy to the peoples whose ter-
ritories he would have traversed ([...] viam tot 
nationibus in Italiam aperiret, Livy, 43. 1. 9).42 A 
few years earlier, the Macedonian king Philip V 
(died in 179 BC) considered invading Italy with 
the help of the barbarians, who were settled along 
the Danube (Livy, 39. 35. 4). The Bastarnae were 
mentioned (cf. 40. 57. 6–7; Justin [Pomp. Trog.], 
prol. 32); however, it would not be possible to 
avoid the Scordisci, particularly because Livy in 
the same context stated that there was no other 
way for an army to reach Italy but to march across 
39  Sonnabend 1998, 204.
40  See also Mayor 2016, 310–314 (= 2010, 327; 341; 
344–345).
41  Alföldy 1974, 35–38; Hofeneder 2018, 37–43; 272–312, 
with an evaluation of all relevant literature.
42  Šašel Kos 2014; see also, for all such attempts, Löffl 
2011, 555.
the territories of the Scordisci (40. 57. 7). Philip 
obviously had a wrong idea about the length of 
Illyricum, because he believed that by climbing to 
the top of Mount Haemus he would be able to see 
the Black Sea, the Adriatic, the Danube and the 
Alps (Livy, 40. 21. 2); in any case, fog prevented 
him from having any view at all.43
Philip was misled by a popular and wide-spread 
tradition, according to which there was a mountain 
somewhere in Illyria, from where it was possible to 
see both the Black Sea and the Adriatic. A similar 
account could be found in Pseudo-Aristotle in his 
Strange Tales (De mirabilibus auscultationibus), 
as well as in Eratosthenes. The latter was also 
criticized by Strabo, who emphasized that these 
were false traditions and popular beliefs (7. 5. 9 
C 317).44 Pseudo-Aristotle did not mention Mt. 
Haemus, but another mountain, called Delphium 
(Velika and Mala Kapela, Velebit?), somewhere in 
the hinterland of the northern Adriatic, between 
the land of the Mentores and the Istri (c. 104 
[839b]). The Mentores seem to have been early 
inhabitants of the Liburnian coast, and later as-
similated to the Liburni, since Pseudo-Scylax, 
when referring to Liburnia, mentioned the islands 
called Mentorides, which might be identified with 
Rab and Pag (c. 21).45
At that time, it was erroneously estimated that 
the distances across the Balkans were shorter and 
the regions not so difficult to traverse. Polybius, 
too, claimed that it was possible to see both seas 
from Mt. Haemus, and so does Pomponius Mela 
(2. 2. 17–18: e quis Haemos in tantum altitudinis 
abit, ut Euxinum et Hadrian ex summo vertice 
ostendat). Polybius was censured by Strabo, who 
writes (7. 5. 1 C 313): Close to the Pontic Sea is 
Mount Haemus, which is the largest and highest 
among mountains in that part of the world, and 
which divides Thrace almost down the middle into 
two parts. (Polybius claims that from this mountain 
both seas may be seen,46 however this is not true, 
since the distance to the Adriatic Sea is great and 
there are many obstacles in the way to obscure the 
view).47
Perseus inherited his father’s plans of attacking 
the Romans across Illyria with the help of the 
43  Jaeger 2011.
44  Cf. Roller 2018, 377.
45  Wilkes 1969, 7; Zaninović 1982, 44; cf. also Vattuone 
2000, 17–22.
46  Polyb. 24. 4 (from Strabo).
47  Roller 2018, 368–369.
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Bastarnae, who would have been sent through 
the land of the Scordisci, called “lower Galatia” by 
Plutarch.48 The Senate was informed of Perseus’ 
project by Eumenes of Pergamum (Livy, 42. 11. 2 
ff.; 42. 11. 4: Bastarnarum gentem excitam sedibus 
suis, quorum auxiliis fretus in Italiam transiret; cf. 
Livy, 40. 5. 9–10; 44. 26. 2 and Plutarch, Aemil. 
Paul. 9. 7). Obviously, the Pannonians had not yet 
become a significant factor in the Balkans at that 
time, because no mention is made of them in these 
plans. An attack on Italy across Illyricum was also 
planned, at an even earlier date, by Antiochus of 
Syria; in 192 BC, Hannibal, who had taken refuge 
at his court, advised him to bring Philip V into 
the war so as to invade Italy together (Livy, 34. 
60; App., Syr. 7; Justin, 31. 3. 5–10).49
CONCLUSION
Mithradates’ plan of invading Italy has not 
been transmitted consistently in the cited sources. 
Strabo mentions a military campaign planned by 
Mithradates up to the Adriatic, possibly ca. 110 
BC: an expedition against the barbarians living 
in the region of the Adriatic as an arrangement 
for a military campaign against the Roman state. 
When contemplating war against the Romans, the 
48  See Papazoglu 1978, 281–282.
49  Cf. Patsch 1932, 32–33; Christ 2003, 146–147; 193.
Adriatic was clearly one of Mithradates’ goals. 
In 75 BC, Sertorius and Mithradates considered 
attacking Italy simultaneously from the west and 
from the east, as is mentioned by Appian. Ac-
cording to Plutarch, Sertorius was compared to 
Hannibal and Mithradates to Pyrrhus. During the 
heyday of his reign Mithradates would have well 
been capable of attacking Italy across the regions 
of the Scordisci and Pannonia, passing the Ocra 
Pass and descending into northern Italy in the 
area of the upper Adriatic.
However, an invasion into Italy that he planned 
shortly before his death would not have been pos-
sible. It is mentioned by several Greek and Latin 
writers, but not consistently, since the cited accounts 
differ in several details. Appian mentioned a march 
through Thrace and Macedonia to Pannonia and 
across the Alps into Italy. In another passage of 
his History of Mithradates, he only referred to the 
Celts and Italy. Plutarch noted Scythia, Paeonia 
(Pannonia), and Italy, while Cassius Dio mentioned 
the Danube, Scythia, and Italy. Florus’ version is 
different, but must obviously be erroneous: he 
made mention of an invasion into Italy through 
Thrace, Macedonia and Greece. Inconsistencies 
may confirm the vagueness of Mithradates’ plan, 
which only resulted in rumours and indeed, no 
action had ever even been contemplated. Florus 
mentioned that Mithradates, not wishing to admit 
utter defeat, considered the idea of invading Italy, 
but was not able to carry it out.
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MITRADAT: 
KRATEK ORIS NJEGOVEGA VLADANJA
Mitradat VI. Evpator Dioniz (Mithradates VI 
Eupator Dionysus: 120–63 pr. Kr.) je bil najsta-
rejši sin Mitradata V. Evergeta (Mithradates V 
Euergetes) in najpomembnejši med kralji Ponta 
v Mali Aziji (sl. 1). Zaradi svojega brezobzirnega 
vladanja, ki se je začelo s tem, da je dal zapreti 
in umoriti mater in mlajšega brata (ki ga je mati 
protežirala), je upravičeno veljal za enega najbolj 
strah zbujajočih sovražnikov Rima. Ko je osvojil 
bosporsko kraljestvo ter severne in severozahodne 
dežele ob Črnem morju vključno s Kolhido, je 
postopoma razširil oblast čez večino regij na ob-
močju Črnega morja. V nekaterih azijskih deželah 
je bil Mitradatov nadzor le posreden, tako npr. v 
Kapadokiji, kjer ga je izvajal ob pomoči lokalnega 
velikaša Gordija (Gordius), svoje sestre Laodike 
in njenega sina Ariarata VII. ter svojega lastnega 
sina, ki je vladal kot Ariarates IX., z Gordijem kot 
regentom. Ob pomoči Nikomeda III. iz Bitinije je 
anektiral Paflagonijo in načrtoval svoja osvajanja 
tudi v mislih na morebitno vojno z Rimljani. Z 
Gajem Marijem se je srečal v Kapadokiji leta 99 
pr. Kr. ali leto zatem; Marijeva misija in njegovi 
nameni niso natančno pojasnjeni.1 Po prihodu 
Sule na vzhod je Mitradat začel resne priprave na 
vojno proti Rimu; svojemu kraljestvu je priključil 
še Kapadokijo in Bitinijo. V tistem času, med 
letoma 91 in 87 pr. Kr., je v rimski državi divjala 
zavezniška vojna, v kateri so se italski zavezniki 
borili proti nadvladi Rima.
Oblast, ki jo je Mitradat imel nad večino obalnih 
predelov Črnega morja, mu je omogočala nabor 
vojakov in preskrbo vojske z vsem, kar je potrebo-
vala. Mej njegovega kraljestva in dežel pod njegovo 
oblastjo ni mogoče natančno določiti, ker so se 
stalno spreminjale glede na njegovo politiko, ki je 
bila delno napadalna in delno defenzivna, včasih 
tudi neuspešna. Nastopal je hkrati kot orientalni 
1  Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 66–71; Mayor 2016, 116–118. 
Zahvaljujem se Andreasu Hofenederju, ki je prebral in 
komentiral moje besedilo. Hvaležna sem tudi Johannesu 
Nollé-u za koristne pripombe k uvodnemu poglavju članka.
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V spomin na Fanulo Papazoglu
despot in razsvetljen helenistični vladar, ki se je 
skliceval tako na perzijsko kot na makedonsko 
poreklo. Proglasil se je za novega Aleksandra in 
Dioniza in svoj helenizem usmeril v osvoboditev 
Grkov izpod jarma “barbarskih” Rimljanov. Nje-
gova politika je bila zapletena mešanica preudarne 
diplomacije, raznih intrig, grobe sile in različnih 
pogajanj, česar ni mogoče opisati v kratkem 
povzetku. Poleg tega prikazi njegovega vladanja 
pri Plutarhu, Apijanu, Kasiju Dionu in v kratkih 
opisih pri Strabonu ter drugih grških in latinskih 
piscih niso vedno usklajeni.
Mitradat je osvojil večino Male Azije in neposredno 
ali posredno povzročil tri velike vojne z Rimljani.2 
V prvi vojni med Rimom in Mitradatom (89–85 
pr. Kr.) so bile Mitradatove vojske uspešne, osvojil 
je večino Azije in leta 88 pr. Kr. ukazal pobiti vse 
Italike in Rimljane, ki so živeli v Mali Aziji; ubili 
naj bi jih 80 000. Ko si je podvrgel provinco Azijo, 
je menil, da bo le začasno pod njegovo oblastjo, 
zato je po deželi na vse načine ropal, deloma za-
radi pomanjkanja denarja, deloma ker ni zaupal 
mestom in njihovim voditeljem, in spodbujal 
piratstvo. Večina Grčije in predvsem tudi Atene 
so se odločile, da stopijo na njegovo stran, ni pa 
mogel osvojiti Rodosa. Leta 87 je v Grčijo prispel 
Sula s petimi legijami, premagal Mitradatove čete, 
kaznoval Atene in nadaljeval pot v Azijo, kjer se 
je kralj vdal in umaknil v Pont.
Vendar se je moral Sula vrniti v Italijo in se 
boriti proti svojim sovražnikom, v Anatoliji pa 
je pustil svojega generala Lucija Licinija Mureno 
(L. Licinius Murena), ki je bil odgovoren za drugo 
vojno proti Mitradatu (ok. 83–81); ta je bila manj 
pomembna in večinoma neuspešna.3 Kljub temu je 
Murena nad Mitradatom slavil triumf, kot so ga vsi 
rimski generali, ki so se borili proti kralju; v tem 
smislu je bil Mitradat “idealen rimski sovražnik”.4 
Tretjo in zadnjo vojno proti Mitradatu je leta 76 ali 
2  H kronologiji vseh treh vojn glej De Callataÿ 1997; 
glej tudi Bratož 2007, 124–126; 131–133; za Mitradatovo 
provokativno politiko: McGing 2009; za razne vidike 
njegove vlade: Højte (ur.) 2009; za arheološko sliko: Lafli, 
Pataci 2016.
3  Broughton 1952, 61; 64; 77.
4  Madsen 2009; id. 2014.
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75 pr. Kr. sprožila smrt Nikomeda IV. iz Bitinije, 
ki je svoje kraljestvo z oporoko zapustil Rimu; 
Rim ga je hotel anektirati, a ga je Mitradat leta 
74 ali 73 napadel. Eden njegovih zaveznikov je bil 
Kvint Sertorij (Quintus Sertorius), rimski upornik 
v Hispaniji, kar meče zanimivo luč na Mitradatove 
dalekosežne povezave.5 V zgodovinskih virih je 
omenjeno, da sta leta 75 pr. Kr. načrtovala sočasen 
napad na Italijo z zahoda in vzhoda.6
Vendar Mitradat ni mogel zavzeti Kizika (Cyzicus) 
v južni Propontidi (Miziji); rimski general Lucij 
Licinij Lukul (L. Licinius Lucullus), ki je mesto 
rešil obleganja, je Mitradata prisilil, da je poiskal 
zatočišče pri svojem zetu, armenskem kralju Ti-
granu II. Mitradat je neuspešno iskal pomoč pri 
Partih in se mu je šele leta 68 uspelo vrniti v Pont. 
Pompej ga je premagal v Armeniji, a ga je leta 66 
pr. Kr. nehal zasledovati, da bi si lahko podvrgel 
Tigrana. Mitradat je prezimil v Dioskuriadi (Dio-
scurias) v Kolhidi, nato pa se je umikal čez Kavkaz 
in se zatekel v svoje bosporsko kraljestvo, kamor je 
prispel leta 65 pr. Kr. Zasedel je Pantikapaj (Pan-
ticapaeum) in nekaj vojske namestil v Fanagoreji 
(Phanagorea) ter tudi v bosporskih pristaniščih 
Herzonezu (Chersonesus), Teodoziji (Theodosia) in 
Nimfeju (Nymphaion);7 pričakoval je namreč napad 
z morja, ker je Pompej svojo mornarico namestil 
v mestu Phasis ob izlivu reke z istim imenom, da 
bi imel nadzor nad dostopom v Bospor. V tem 
času naj bi Mitradat načrtoval veliko invazijo v 
Italijo čez Ilirik.8 Vendar je njegov sin Farnaces 
(Pharnaces) organiziral upor proti njemu in 63 
pr. Kr. si je Mitradat sam vzel življenje, čeprav ni 
povsem izključeno, da ga niso ubili.9
Apijan iz Aleksandrije je glavni vir, ki omenja 
načrt Mitradata VI. Evpatorja, da bi napadel Italijo 
čez Ilirik. Ta vpad, o katerem je kralj razmišljal 
proti koncu svojega življenja, omenjajo tudi Plutarh, 
Kasij Dion in Flor, medtem ko se Strabonovo po-
ročilo nanaša na vojaško odpravo proti Rimljanom 
do Jadrana, ki jo je Mitradat načrtoval na samem 
začetku svojega vladanja.
5  Arrayás Morales 2016.
6  Plut., Sert. 23; App., Mithr. 68; glej nižje.
7  Plut., Pomp. 32, 9; App., Mithr. 101–102 (prim. 107 
in 108); Liv., Epit. 101; Cass. Dio 36, 50, 2; Gajdukevič 
1971, 320–322; McGing 1986, 162–165.
8  Mastrocinque 1999, 103–109.
9  Sherwin-White 1994, 254–255.
MITRADATOVA NAČRTOVANA VOJAŠKA 
ODPRAVA NA JADRAN V STRABONOVI 
GEOGRAFIJI
Strabon omenja pontskega kralja v sedmi knjigi 
svoje Geografije, v kateri opisuje severno Evropo 
in Germanijo ter Ilirijo, Tesalijo, Makedonijo in 
pontske dežele vse do reke Tanais.10 Proti koncu 
tretjega poglavja je navedel dežele ob rekah Bo-
rysthenes (Dneper) and Hypanis (Bog), mesta in 
naselja ob obeh rekah kot tudi ljudstva v notranjosti, 
sarmatske Jazige in razna germanska ljudstva, npr. 
Bastarne in Tiregete (Tyregetae) in najbolj severne 
med njimi, Roksolane, ki so se bojevali z generali 
Mitradata Evpatorja (7, 3, 17 C 306).
V naslednjem razdelku Strabon omenja mrzle 
dežele ob jezeru Meotidi (Maeotis, zdaj Azovsko 
morje), kjer ljudje niso gojili oslov, ker so te živali 
občutljive za mraz, konji so majhni, govedo pa nima 
rogov. Pozimi dobijo ribe tako, da jih izkopljejo iz 
ledu; ko voda v bronastih vrčih zmrzne, ti počijo.
Mitradatov general Neoptolem je te barbare 
premagal poleti v pomorski bitki, pozimi pa s 
konjenico, verjetno med letoma 99 in 95 pr. Kr. 
ali celo v osemdesetih letih pr. Kr., morda pa tudi 
že tako zgodaj kot konec 2. stoletja pr. Kr.11 V 
času vlade Filipa II., očeta Aleksandra Velikega, 
je večini teh ljudstev vladal Ateas. Iz Lukijanovega 
spisa Stoletniki (Macrobii) je znano, da je bil ubit 
v vojni proti makedonskemu kralju, ko je bil star 
devetdeset let.12 V 4. stoletju pr. Kr. so Makedonci 
dejansko imeli stike s temi oddaljenimi ljudstvi.
V četrtem poglavju je Strabon opisal Tavriški 
Herzonez (zdaj polotok Krim) z istoimenskim 
mestom, ki je potem, ko so ga napadli in izropali 
barbari, poklicalo na pomoč Mitradata Evpator-
ja, da bi ga zaščitil. Na koncu tega opisa Strabon 
omenja Jadran:
7, 4, 3 C 309:
... (Mitradat) je nato načrtoval, da bi z vojsko 
odrinil proti barbarom, ki so živeli nad ožino do 
reke Borysthenes, in proti tistim, ki so živeli na 
Jadranu; to so bile priprave na vojaško odpravo 
proti Rimljanom.
Strabon je glede na povezave svoje družine s 
pontskimi kralji nedvomno dobro poznal te dežele 
kot tudi zgodovinska dogajanja v času Mitradatovega 
vladanja. Kljub temu je omemba teh dveh vojaških 
10  Komentar k vsem citiranim odlomkom: Roller 
2018, 360–364.
11  Geyer 1935; Roller 2018, 362.
12  Macrobii 10.
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odprav v enem stavku težko razumljiva. Lahko bi jo 
razložili z domnevo, da si je Strabon Mitradatovo 
politiko razlagal kot proces, ki je bil od samega 
začetka usmerjen v vojno proti Rimljanom.13 Ni 
jasno, kdaj se je Mitradat bojeval proti Skitom in 
drugim barbarskim ljudstvom v deželah do reke 
Boristena, morda leta 110 ali 109 pr. Kr. ali celo 
pet let pred tem,14 kar je verjetno prezgodaj zato, 
ker je v istem stavku omenjena vojaška odprava 
proti Rimljanom. Verjetno je imel Mitradat de-
jansko že zgodaj v načrtu, da bi z vojsko prodrl 
vse do Jadrana, a o tem ni znanega nič več kot to. 
Zgodnjo vojaško odpravo, ki naj bi Mitradatovo 
vojsko pripeljala do Jadrana, je morda treba po-
vezati z njegovim sicer neznanim dogovarjanjem 
s katerim od vladarjev na Balkanu ali pa morda z 
njegovim zgodnjim delovanjem v Grčiji.
NAMERAVANA INVAZIJA ITALIJE 
MALO PRED MITRADATOVO SMRTJO: 
PODATKI PRI APIJANU
Apijan je za svojo pripoved po vsej verjetnosti 
uporabil grški vir, ki ni bil posebno naklonjen 
Lukulu in Pompeju.15 V svoji Zgodovini Mitradata 
VI., kjer je pisal o dogodkih leta 65 pr. Kr., Apijan 
pravi (102, 472–473):
Mitradat je končno prispel do dežel ob Meotidi 
(Azovsko morje), kjer je vladalo mnogo princev; vsi 
so ga sprejeli, mu dali spremstvo in z njim izmenjali 
številna darila, saj so dobro poznali sloves njegovih 
dejanj, njegov imperij in njegovo moč, ki je še nikakor 
ni bilo mogoče podcenjevati. Mitradat je z njimi celo 
sklenil zavezništvo in razmišljal o novih in nenava-
dnih podvigih, npr. o vojaški odpravi čez Trakijo v 
Makedonijo in čez deželo Makedoncev do Peoncev 
(namreč Panoncev) ter čez Alpe v Italijo (sl. 2).16
Ni namreč dvoma, da je treba Peonce v tem 
kontekstu razumeti kot Panonce v Panoniji in ne 
13  Roller 2018, 363–364.
14  Geyer 1932, 2164; bolj zgodaj: McGing 1986, 46–47; 
glej Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 43–55.
15  Mastrocinque 1999, 103–109.
16  ὁ δὲ Μιθριδάτης ἐς τὴν Μαιῶτιν ἐμβαλών, ἧς εἰσι 
πολλοὶ δυνάσται, πάντων αὐτὸν κατὰ κλέος ἔργων τε καὶ 
ἀρχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως ἔτι οἱ παρούσης ἀξιολόγου δεχομένων 
τε καὶ παραπεμπόντων καὶ δῶρα πολλὰ φερόντων καὶ 
κομιζομένων ἕτερα, ὃ δὲ καὶ συμμαχίαν αὐτοῖς ἐτίθετο, 
ἐπινοῶν ἕτερα καινότερα, διὰ Θρᾴκης ἐς Μακεδονίαν καὶ 
διὰ Μακεδόνων ἐς Παίονας ἐμβαλὼν ὑπερελθεῖν ἐς τὴν 
Ἰταλίαν τὰ Ἄλπεια ὄρη· Komentar k epizodi pri Šašel Kos 
2005, 530–534.
Peonce severno od Makedonije.17 Apijan je o Pe-
oncih pisal v svoji Ilirski zgodovini, v 14. poglavju, 
iz katerega izhaja, da ni pravilno razlikoval med 
obema ljudstvoma.18 V večini primerov je imel v 
mislih Panonce, ko je pisal o Peoncih, “Panonce” 
je omenil le, ko je razložil, da se imenujejo Peonci.
V isti Zgodovini Mitradata VI., a več razdelkov 
pozneje (kar verjetno pomeni, da je uporabljal 
različne vire), je Apijan ponovno omenil Mitrada-
tov načrt, da bi napadel Italijo čez deželo Keltov. 
V prej citiranem odlomku Apijan ni omenil tega 
pomembnega ljudstva, ki je bilo naseljeno na Bal-
kanu blizu Donave in katerega deželo bi Mitradat 
na poti v Italijo nujno moral prečkati. Omenil ga 
je v 109. poglavju svoje Zgodovine Mitradata VI., 
kjer je ponovno pisal o načrtu kralja, da bi vpadel 
v Italijo. Kelti so bili prvi, ki so zapirali pot do 
Panoncev in Italije (Mithrid. 109, 518–519):
Mitradat je nameraval z vojsko do Keltov, katerih 
prijateljstvo je dolga leta negoval s tem namenom, 
in z njimi napasti Italijo v upanju, da se mu bodo 
priključili mnogi Italiki sami od sebe, zaradi sovra-
štva do Rimljanov. Slišal je namreč, da je bila to 
Hanibalova politika, ko so se Rimljani z njim bojevali 
v Hispaniji, in da jim je na ta način povzročil silno 
grozo. Vendar je Apijan tudi dodal, da Mitradatovi 
vojaki niso zaupali temu drznemu načrtu; bali so 
se namreč poraza in niso hoteli na pot čez Balkan: 
Navdušen nad svojo idejo je hotel takoj odriniti do 
Keltov, toda vojake je odvrnila drznost načrta, ki 
bi Mitradatu prinesla veliko slavo, oni pa bi morali 
služiti vojsko dalj časa v tuji deželi, proti možem, ki 
jih še v lastni deželi niso mogli premagati.19
Edino keltsko ljudstvo, ki bi lahko bilo Mitradatov 
zaveznik na poti proti Panoniji, so bili Skordiski, 
naseljeni na širokem območju izliva Save v Donavo 
in v dolini Morave (Margus).20 V deželah zahodno 
od njih je prebivalo keltsko ljudstvo Tavriskov.21 
Če bi Mitradat dejansko uresničil svoj načrt, bi 
morala njegova vojska na poti v Panonijo prečkati 
deželo keltskih Skordiskov, ki bi za vojsko v resnici 
lahko bila nevarnost. Manj verjetno je, da bi to bili 
17  Sherwin-White 1984, 205–206, je napačno smatral, 
da se Apijanova omemba Peoncev nanaša na Peonijo, in 
zato menil, da bi bil Mitradatov načrt neuresničljiv. Glej 
tudi Ballesteros Pastor 1996, 273, za podoben nesporazum.
18  Komentar pri Šašel Kos 2005.
19  Ibid., 109, 520–521. Glej tudi Plutarh (Pomp., 41, 
2), Strabon (7, 4, 3 C 309) in Kasij Dion (37, 11). Za Flora 
(1, 40, 25) glej nižje.
20  Papazoglu 1978, 271 ss; Popović 1999, prim. Tapavički-
Ilić 2004.
21  Božič 1991; Dizdar 2001; Guštin 2011.
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Bastarni, ki so bili tudi Mitradatovi zavezniki,22 
deloma zato, ker so jih šteli za Germane,23 predvsem 
pa niso pomenili kritične ovire na Mitradatovi 
načrtovani poti v Italijo.
JE BIL TA NAČRT LE FANTAZIJA 
ALI NAMERNO ZAVAJAJOČA INFORMACIJA?
Mitradat je načrtoval napad na Italijo že v času 
svojih stikov s Sertorijem leta 75 pr. Kr. Apijan 
piše, da sta dva Sertorijeva podpornika, Lucij Magij 
(Lucius Magius) in Lucij Fanij (Lucius Fannius), 
posredovala pri kralju, naj se poveže s Sertorijem 
(Mithr. 68): Mitradat ... je poslal k Sertoriju odpo-
slanca. Sertorij ju je predstavil v svojem senatu in 
se pohvalil, da njegov sloves sega vse do Ponta in da 
lahko rimsko državo zdaj napade tako z vzhoda kot 
z zahoda. Plutarh piše, da so Sertorija primerjali 
s Hanibalom, Mitradata pa s Pirom (Sert. 23). 
Vendar pa tega dvojnega napada nista nikdar niti 
poskusila izvesti.
Pri Apijanu opisan Mitradatov načrt o vpadu 
v Italijo, o katerem je kralj razmišljal malo pred 
smrtjo, omenjajo tudi Plutarh, Kasij Dion in Flor.24 
Plutarh ga omeni, ko piše o Pompejevem pohodu 
v Petro, glavno mesto arabskih Nabatejcev, kjer 
je rimski general želel dobiti od nabatejskega 
kralja osebno zagotovilo, da se bo držal ukazov 
rimske vojske. Pompejevi privrženci so smatrali 
odpravo za nepotrebno, saj se je Pompej zaradi nje 
izognil zasledovanju starega rimskega sovražnika 
Mitradata, še posebej, ker se je govorilo, da kralj 
pripravlja pohod čez Skitijo in Peonijo v Italijo 
(Pomp. 41, 2: ... ὡς ἀπηγγέλλετο, διὰ Σκυθῶν 
καὶ Παιόνων στρατὸν ἐλαύνειν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἰταλίαν). 
Peonija je nedvomno Panonija, kar je jasno ne le 
iz konteksta, ampak tudi glede na običajno rabo 
imena pri grških avtorjih, ki so pisali v rimskem 
obdobju. Dion podobno omenja Mitradatov načrt, 
da bi napadel Italijo z območja Donave in Skitije 
(37, 11, 1–2: ... πρός τε τὸν Ἴστρον Σκυθῶν ἐλθεῖν, 
κἀντεῦθεν ἐς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐσβαλεῖν).
22  Papazoglu 1978, 312–313; prim. Popović 1999.
23  Strabon 7, 3, 17 C 306; Plinij (N. h. 4, 100) in Tacit 
(Germ. 46, 1).
24  Justin omenja odposlanstva, ki jih je Mitradat poslal 
h Kimbrom, Galatom (Gallograeci), Sarmatom in Bastarnom 
(38, 3, 7), in Hanibala, invazijo Keltov onstran Alp v Italijo 
ter azijske Kelte, ki so se podali na dolgo in težko pot čez 
Ilirik in Trakijo v svojo novo domovino (38, 4, 1–10). 
Prim. Ballesteros Pastor 2013, 214–216.
Flor pa omenja invazijo čez Trakijo, Makedonijo 
in Grčijo, običajno pot, po kateri so se rimske 
vojske vračale z vzhoda v Italijo čez morje, ali pa 
obratno, potovale iz Italije na vzhod. Poudaril je, 
da je bil to le načrt; Mitradat naj bi celo razmišljal, 
da bi zgradil most čez Bospor. Florovo besedilo 
se glasi (1, 40, 24–26):
To noč [po bitki v Armeniji, v kateri je Pompej 
kralja odločilno premagal] je bil Mitradat dokonč-
no poražen; nikdar več ni namreč napravil karkoli 
omembe vrednega. Kot kača, ki ima zdrobljeno glavo, 
pa do konca grozi z repom, je poskušal vse mogoče. 
Ko je pred sovražnikom pobegnil h Kolhijcem, je 
razmišljal o velikem načrtu, da bi premostil Bospor 
in čez Trakijo, Makedonijo in Grčijo nepričakovano 
vdrl v Italijo. Toda potem, ko so ga zapustili podaniki 
in ga je izdal sin Farnak (Pharnaces), je z mečem 
končal svoje življenje, kajti zaman se je trudil, da 
bi ga s strupom.25
Prevod stavka, ki govori o načrtovanem napadu 
na Italijo ([...] iungere Bosporon, inde per Thracen 
Macedoniamque et Graeciam transilire, sic Italiam 
nec opinatus invadere – tantum cogitavit), se v 
francoski izdaji Collection Budé glasi: “... si je 
zamislil veličasten načrt, da bi premostil Bospor, 
odhitel čez Trakijo, Makedonijo in Grčijo ter nato 
nepričakovano vpadel v Italijo”.26 
Odprava čez Makedonijo in Grčijo bi pomenila 
potovanje po Egnatijski cesti (via Egnatia). V tem 
primeru bi Mitradat na južnem Jadranu potreboval 
mornarico; v času malo pred njegovim koncem ne 
bi bilo mogoče ne eno ne drugo. Glede na to, da 
vsi drugi avtorji omenjajo Mitradatov načrtovani 
pohod čez Ilirik, je jasno, da je Flor v svojem opisu 
navedel napačne dežele. Najverjetneje se ni zavedal, 
da pod Peonijo, ki jo je našel v svojem viru, ne gre 
razumeti dežele severno od Makedonije, temveč 
gre za Panonijo.
Jasno je, da Mitradatov načrt ni bil nikdar ure-
sničen, vprašanje pa je, ali bi sploh bil uresničljiv. 
Theodor Mommsen je bil mnenja, da ne: “Diese 
beabsichtigte Invasion der Orientalen in Italien 
war einfach lächerlich und nichts als die Ausgeburt 
25  Besedilo se v latinščini glasi: (24) Et Mithridates 
quidem nocte illa debellatus est. Nihil enim postea valuit, 
quamquam omnia expertus more anguium, qui optrito capite 
postremum cauda minantur. (25) Quippe cum efugisset 
hostem Colchis tenus, iungere Bosporon, inde per Thracen 
Macedoniamque et Graeciam transilire, sic Italiam nec 
opinatus invadere – tantum cogitavit. (26) Sed defectione 
civium Pharnacisque filii scelere praeventus male temptatum 
veneno spiritum ferro expulit.
26  Jal 1967, 95.
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einer ohnmächtig phantasierenden Verzweiflung.”27 
Théodore Reinach pa je načrt označil kot sanje 
mladega Mitradata, ki jih v drugačnih okoliščinah 
ne bi bilo nemogoče uresničiti.28 Fritz Geyer tudi 
ni smatral načrta za nemogočega: “So phantastisch 
dieser Plan auf den ersten Blick auch erscheint, 
unmöglich war unter den damaligen Verhältnissen 
ein Erfolg nicht.”29 Fanula Papazoglu Mitradatovega 
načrta ni posebej komentirala, ampak le omenjala, 
vendar vedno kot odpravo, ki bi bila izvedljiva, 
enako tudi Gajdukevič.30 Mnenji se ne izključujeta 
povsem, jasno pa je, da malo pred svojo smrtjo, ko 
je Mitradat (ponovno) načrtoval vpad v Italijo, tega 
gotovo ne bi mogel uresničiti. Ladislas Havas je 
smatral Mitradatov načrt za realističen in strateško 
daljnoviden projekt, povezan s Katilinovo zaroto: 
Mitradatu naj bi poleg zarotnikov kot zavezniki 
pomagali prijateljski Kelti, ki naj bi bili precej 
oddaljeni Alobrogi.31 Vendar svoje hipoteze ni 
argumentiral prepričljivo in tudi sicer ni smiselna.
V času, ko je bil Mitradat na vrhuncu moči in 
je imel na razpolago vse vire in sredstva, bi svoj 
načrt po vsej verjetnosti lahko uresničil in Rimljani 
so se dobro zavedali nevarnosti, ki jim je pretila s 
strani pontskega kralja. Malo pred izbruhom tretje 
vojne proti Mitradatu so se sistematično bojevali 
z ljudstvi na Balkanu, ki bi lahko bili Mitradatovi 
zavezniki. To bi izhajalo iz vojaške odprave Gaja 
Skribonija Kuriona (C. Scribonius Curio), pro-
konzula Makedonije med letoma 75 in 72 pr. Kr., 
ki je nadaljeval vojno svojega predhodnika Apija 
Klavdija Pulhra (Appius Claudius Pulcher, 77–76 
pr. Kr.). S (pre)veliko vojsko petih legij je premagal 
Dardance in bil prvi rimski general, ki je dosegel 
Donavo in prodrl vse do Dacije.32
Holger Sonnabend je izčrpno komentiral Mi-
tradatove poslednje načrte (ne pa podobnih iz 
zgodnejšega časa njegove vlade) in moderne 
komentarje, ki jih je razvrstil v tri glavne teze; 
27  Mommsen 1909, 135.
28  Reinach 1895, 402–404. Pravilno je poudaril “drugačne 
okoliščine”, zato se mi zdi Bengtsonova kritična pripomba 
(1975, 275: “... die Phantasie dem sonst so kritischen Forscher 
einen Streich gespielt [hat]”) neupravičena.
29  Geyer 1932, 2196.
30  E.g. Papazoglu 1978, 312–313; Gajdukevič 1971, 
320–321. Bratož 2007, 133, je načrt pripisal Mitradatovi 
napačni predstavi o razdaljah na Balkanu.
31  Havas 1968, posebej 13–25, vendar njegovi argumenti 
niso le hipotetični, ampak tudi malo verjetni, glej Ballesteros 
Pastor 1996, 270–274, ki jih je prepričljivo zavrnil.
32  Syme 1999, 135–136; prim. Wheeler 2011, 197–199; 
nazadnje Petković 2014.
opozoril je na njihove šibke točke in predlagal 
svojo razlago, ki nedvomno lahko velja za dobro 
utemeljeno. Povzela bom bistvo omenjenih tez, ne 
da bi in extenso navajala argumente za in proti, ki 
so zlahka dostopni v Sonnabendovem članku.33 Prva 
hipoteza, po kateri Mitradat ni mogel uresničiti 
svojega sicer stvarnega načrta le zaradi Farnakovega 
upora, je po njegovem mnenju najmanj verjetna. 
Toda kot je bilo omenjeno, je to tezo zagovarjala 
cela vrsta avtorjev, tudi Havas.
Nekateri interpreti so predlagali, da bi bila 
načrtovana invazija Italije ideja Mitradatovih so-
dobnikov in jo je treba obravnavati kot legendo34 
oziroma da so si jo izmislili njegovi sovražniki, 
ki so hoteli kralja prikazati kot popolnoma nere-
alnega stratega. Ta sovražna propaganda bi lahko 
služila njegovemu sinu Farnaku, ki si je prizadeval 
pridobiti na svojo stran čete svojega očeta,35 ali 
pa Pompejevim političnim nasprotnikom, da bi 
uničili njegov ugled, češ da leta 66 pr. Kr. ni mogel 
premagati Mitradata.36 To se zdi manj verjetno, 
kot tudi teza, da je Mitradatov zadnji načrt treba 
razložiti kot literarni topos.37 To slednjo razlago 
je Sonnabend obravnaval kot tretjo tezo,38 sam 
pa je predlagal četrto. Mitradat naj bi sam raz-
širil govorice o vpadu v Italijo (česar ni nikdar 
nameraval izvesti), da bi poudaril pomembnost 
svoje politične pozicije in morda prepričal Pom-
peja, da bi z njim nadaljeval pogajanja. Dejansko 
je veliko bolj verjetno, da si invazije Italije niso 
izmislili Mitradatovi sovražniki, temveč si jo je 
zamislil kralj sam. Kot omenjeno, je razmišljal o 
takšnem vpadu že na začetku svoje vlade. Ne bi 
bilo nemogoče, da bi ga njegovi sovražniki zaradi 
tega načrta osmešili in mu s tem škodili. Nobena 
od omenjenih hipotez ni povsem nemogoča,39 v 
obširni literaturi o Mitradatu VI. Evpatorju pa 
najdemo še druge, ki se v podrobnostih nekoliko 
razlikujejo.40
33  Sonnabend 1998. Pod istim naslovom je študent 
objavil svojo seminarsko nalogo (Gruber 2005), ki vsebuje 
kratek in površen povzetek te razprave.
34  Bengtson 1975, 275–276.
35  McGing 1986, 165.
36  Sherwin-White 1984, 205; o tem razpravlja Sonnabend 
1998, 201–203.
37  Kot npr. Strobel 1996, 146–149.
38  Sonnabend 1998, 203–204.
39  Sonnabend 1998, 204.
40  Glej tudi Mayor 2016, 310–314 (= 2010, 327; 341; 
344–345).
170 Marjeta ŠAŠEL KOS
PREDHODNI POSKUSI POHODOV 
ČEZ ILIRIK
Čeprav Mitradat načrtovanega vpada v Italijo 
malo pred svojim koncem ni nameraval uresničiti, 
je treba poudariti, da je bil vdor v Italijo z vzhoda 
grožnja vse od časa, ko so leta 113 pr. Kr. Kimbri 
vdrli v Norik in pri Noreji premagali Gneja Papirija 
Karbona (Cn. Papirius Carbo). Gaj Marij (C. Ma-
rius) jih je šele leta 101 pr. Kr. premagal v severni 
Italiji.41 Rimska država pa se je že pred tem bala 
morebitnega vpada v Italijo čez tako imenovana 
iliro-italska vrata pri Postojni. Ko je leta 171 pr. 
Kr. Gaj Kasij Longin (C. Cassius Longinus), ki je 
dobil v upravo Cisalpinsko Galijo, zapustil svojo 
provinco in se z vojsko napotil v Makedonijo, kjer 
je upal na zmago in triumf, je senat takoj ukrepal 
in mu preprečil pohod. Senatorji so izrazili strah, 
da bi Longinovo prodiranje čez Balkan utegnilo 
odpreti pot v Italijo vsem tistim ljudstvom, kate-
rih teritorij bi prečkal ([...] viam tot nationibus in 
Italiam aperiret, Livij, 43, 1, 9).42 Nekaj let prej je 
makedonski kralj Filip V. (umrl 179 pr. Kr.) raz-
mišljal o napadu na Italijo ob pomoči barbarov, 
naseljenih ob Donavi (Livij, 39, 35, 4). Omenjeni 
so bili Bastarni (prim. 40, 57, 6–7; Justin [Pomp. 
Trog.], prol. 32), nikakor pa se ne bi bilo mogoče 
izogniti Skordiskom, posebno ker je Livij v istem 
kontekstu zapisal, da vojska, ki hoče v Italijo, 
ne more prodirati nikjer drugje kot čez ozemlje 
Skordiskov (40, 57, 7). Filip je imel očitno napačno 
predstavo o dolžini Ilirika, saj je menil, da bo z 
vrha gore Hem (Haemus, pogorje Balkan) lahko 
videl Črno morje, Jadran, Donavo in Alpe (Livij, 
40, 21, 2), vendar zaradi megle ni videl ničesar.43
Filipa je zavedlo splošno razširjeno ljudsko iz-
ročilo, da bi nekje v Iliriji obstajala gora, s katere 
bi bilo mogoče videti tako Črno morje kot Jadran. 
Podoben opis je ohranjen pri Psevdoaristotelu 
v njegovih Nenavadnih zgodbah (De mirabilibus 
auscultationibus) in pri Eratostenu. Eratostena je 
kritiziral Strabon, ki je poudaril, da so to napačna 
41  Alföldy 1974, 35–38; Hofeneder 2018, 37–43; 272–312, 
ki je kritično komentiral vso relevantno literaturo.
42  Šašel Kos 2014; glej za vse takšne poskuse tudi 
Löffl 2011, 555.
43  Jaeger 2011.
izročila in ljudska vera (7, 5, 9 C 317).44 Psevdo-
aristotel ni omenjal gore Hem, ampak neko drugo 
goro, ki se je imenovala Delfij (Delphium, Velika in 
Mala Kapela, Velebit?), nekje v zaledju severnega 
Jadrana, med deželo Mentorov (Mentores) in Istrov 
(c. 104 [839b]). Mentori so bili po vsej verjetnosti 
zgodnji prebivalci liburnijske obale, pozneje del 
Liburnov, kar sklepamo po tem, da Psevdoskilak 
omenja otoke Mentoride v Liburniji, ki bi jih lahko 
enačili z Rabom in Pagom (c. 21).45
Še v 2. stoletju pr. Kr. je veljalo napačno prepriča-
nje, da so razdalje čez Balkan krajše in dežele lažje 
prehodne. Tudi Polibij je trdil, da je z gore Hem 
mogoče videti obe morji, in podobnega mnenja 
je bil tudi Pomponij Mela (Pomponius Mela; 2, 2, 
17–18: e quis Haemos in tantum altitudinis abit, ut 
Euxinum et Hadrian ex summo vertice ostendat). 
Polibija je kritiziral Strabon, ki piše (7, 5, 1 C 313): 
Blizu Pontskega morja je gora Hem, ki sodi med 
največje in najvišje gore v tem delu sveta in ki deli 
Trakijo skoraj po sredi na dva dela. (Polibij trdi, 
da je s te gore mogoče videti obe morji,46 vendar to 
ni res, saj je razdalja do Jadranskega morja velika, 
na poti pa je cela vrsta preprek, ki preprečujejo 
razgled).47
Perzej je nasledil očetove načrte, da bi napadel 
Rimljane čez Ilirijo ob pomoči Bastarnov; ti naj 
bi prodirali čez deželo Skordiskov, ki jo Plutarh 
imenuje “Spodnja Galatija”.48 O Perzejevem načrtu 
je senat obvestil Evmenes iz Pergamona (Livij, 42, 
11, 2  ss.; 42, 11, 4: Bastarnarum gentem excitam 
sedibus suis, quorum auxiliis fretus in Italiam 
transiret; prim. Livij, 40, 5, 9–10; 44, 26, 2, in 
Plutarh, Aemil. Paul. 9, 7). Očitno je, da Panonci 
takrat na Balkanu še niso bili pomemben faktor, 
saj jih v zvezi s temi načrti nihče ne omenja. Še 
bolj zgodaj je napad na Italijo čez Ilirik načrtoval 
Antioh iz Sirije; Hanibal, ki se je leta 192 pr. Kr. 
zatekel na njegov dvor, mu je svetoval, naj pridobi 
za vojno Filipa V., da bosta skupaj vpadla v Italijo 
(Livij, 34, 60; Apijan, Syr. 7; Justin, 31, 3, 5–10).49
44  Prim. Roller 2018, 377.
45  Wilkes 1969, 7; Zaninović 1982, 44; glej tudi Vattuone 
2000, 17–22.
46  Polyb. 24. 4 (iz Strabona).
47  Roller 2018, 368–369.
48  Papazoglu 1978, 281–282.
49  Prim. Patsch 1932, 32–33; Christ 2003, 146–147; 193.
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SKLEP
Mitradatov načrt o napadu Italije v virih, ki 
sem jih komentirala, ni sporočen enotno. Stra-
bon omenja vojaško odpravo do Jadrana, ki jo je 
Mitradat načrtoval verjetno ok. leta 110 pr. Kr.; 
ta pohod proti barbarom, ki so živeli na območju 
Jadrana, naj bi bil priprava na vojno proti rimski 
državi. Ko jo je Mitradat načrtoval, je bil Jadran 
očitno eden njegovih ciljev. Apijan omenja, da sta 
leta 75 pr. Kr. Sertorij in Mitradat razmišljala o 
napadu na Italijo hkrati z zahoda in vzhoda. Kot 
piše Plutarh, so Sertorija primerjali s Hanibalom, 
Mitradata pa s Pirom. Na vrhuncu svojega vladanja 
bi bil Mitradat nedvomno zmožen napasti Italijo 
čez teritorij Skordiskov in Panonijo, prečkati pre-
laz Okro in vpasti v severno Italijo na območju 
severnega Jadrana.
Invazije Italije pa, ki jo je načrtoval malo pred 
svojo smrtjo, takrat ne bi mogel več uresničiti. 
Omenja jo več grških in rimskih piscev, vendar 
ne enotno, saj se njihovi opisi v več podrobnostih 
razlikujejo. Apijan opisuje pohod čez Trakijo in 
Makedonijo v Panonijo in čez Alpe v Italijo. Na 
drugem mestu v svoji Zgodovini Mitradata VI. 
omenja le Kelte in Italijo. Plutarh omenja Skitijo, 
Peonijo (= Panonijo) in Italijo, Kasij Dion pa 
Donavo, Skitijo in Italijo. Florova verzija se od 
omenjenih razlikuje, a je očitno napačna: omenja 
invazijo v Italijo čez Trakijo, Makedonijo in Grčijo. 
Nedoslednosti potrjujejo nejasnost Mitradatovega 
načrta, ki je bil omejen le na govorice, saj ga kralj 
ni nameraval uresničiti. Florus je namreč pouda-
ril, da je Mitradat, ki ni želel priznati popolnega 
poraza, razmišljal o vpadu v Italijo, vendar le na 
teoretični ravni.
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